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In comparing fiscal indicators of Japan and Australia, it is generally perceived that
Japan’s fiscal conditions are very serious and those of Australia are very sound.
However, in Australia the rising ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP is the source of
anxiety in the market, which in turn reduces the flexibility of fiscal policy. If such
economic conditions are considered, the evaluation of Australia’s fiscal conditions is
worse than one based on fiscal indicator alone, while the opposite relationship is the
case for Japan. The fiscal conditions of the two countries are a good example to
demonstrate that fiscal conditions should be evaluated as part of economic conditions.
1 Introduction
In comparing fiscal indicators of Japan and Australia, Japan has been in huge fiscal deficit and
the fiscal liabilities are increasing, so fiscal sustainability is said to be of concern. However,
while Australia has been in fiscal surplus for almost 10 years, its net fiscal liabilities became
negative recently. Based on these facts, the general view is that Japan’s fiscal conditions are
very serious and those of Australia are very sound. With these indicators in direct contrast in
the two countries, would the evaluations of those fiscal conditions really be opposite?
In Australia, the current account deficit is large and foreign liabilities have increased
noticeably. It does not seem to matter so much to the Australian authorities whether foreign
liabilities increase or not. However, in a broad sense fiscal liabilities and foreign liabilities ought
to be similar in character, as ultimately the entire nation bears the liabilities. Considering such
similarity, the sustainability of the Australia’s foreign liabilities must be of some concern. If
so, that would influence fiscal conditions adversely.
In this connection, as Musgrave (1959) shows, given the three functions of public
finance—‘the allocation’ of resources, ‘the distribution’ of income and wealth, and ‘the
stabilisation’ of an economy—public finance functions in relation with the national economy.
Accordingly, if economic conditions deteriorated, this would affect the requirement for public
finance, and if public finance performed its function appropriately, fiscal indicators would
change in response to this. Even if public finance did not, the deterioration of economic
conditions would be a potential factor in a change of fiscal indicators. Of course, existing2
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evaluations of fiscal conditions would generally reflect economic conditions. However, it is
hard to say that these evaluations do this explicitly; these evaluations seem to depend largely
on fiscal indicators.
From this point of view, in order to evaluate fiscal conditions more appropriately, one
should examine under what circumstances fiscal conditions are assessed to be sound in the
first place. In particular, it would be necessary to examine what explicit influence economic
conditions (including the state of foreign liabilities) have on fiscal conditions.1 If fiscal
conditions were evaluated considering those points, the evaluations of the two countries would
be a little different from the general view. This is the subject of concern.
2 Fiscal developments, evaluating fiscal conditions in Japan and
Australia
Let us look at recent fiscal developments in Japan.2 Since the collapse of the ‘Bubble’ in Japan
in the early 1990s, the government had implemented expenditure increases and tax cuts
successively to ease the impact of an economic downturn. Although tax revenues had already
stagnated due to the downturn, tax cuts exacerbated fiscal conditions. Thus, expenditure kept
increasing while revenue showed little improvement. As a result, the fiscal deficit increased
steeply (Figure 1) and fiscal liabilities accumulated rapidly (Figure 2). The ratio of fiscal
liabilities to GDP (or the fiscal liabilities ratio) was extremely high in comparison to other
developed countries (Table 1).
Note: The figures of Japan exclude the account balance on Social Security Fund as noted in footnote 7.
Source: OECD, 'Economic Outlook No.79'.
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Figure 2 Gross fiscal liabilities in Japan and Australia
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Table 1 Gross fiscal liabilities in major countries, (% of GDP)
1990 2005 Comparison with 1990
Australia 21.9 14.4 –7.5
Japan 68.6 172.1 +103.5
Canada 74.5 69.3 –5.2
France 38.6 76.5 +37.9
Germany 41.5 69.6 +28.1
Italy - 121.4 –
Korea 7.8 24.8 +17.0
New Zealand – 26.5 –
United Kingdom 33.0 47.2 +14.2
United States 66.6 64.1 –2.5
Euro area 48.4 77.5 +29.1
Total OECD 56.3 77.7 +21.4
Source: OECD,’Economic Outlook No.79'.
Recently, the fiscal deficit has been decreasing as economic recovery increased revenue
and every effort to curtail expenditures continued. Nevertheless, almost all the fiscal deficit
is structural3, which shows that the structural reform of the fiscal system is necessary, as
economic recovery will not reduce the fiscal deficit significantly. Furthermore, the fiscal4
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liabilities ratio still keeps increasing and the primary balance4 is in deficit. Thus, Japan’s public
finances are still in a serious condition.
In Australia in the early 1990s when an economic downturn occurred, the fiscal
balance deteriorated with the introduction of economic stimuli at the same time as revenue
decreased. However, the economy recovered rapidly from the mid-1990s. Therefore, tax
revenues increased, while the authorities endeavoured to curtail expenditure. Accordingly, the
fiscal deficit declined steeply, and the fiscal balance has been almost in surplus since 1998
(Figure 1). As a result, fiscal liabilities decreased rapidly; the ratio to GDP fell from 42 per
cent in 1995, the worst figure for 20 years, to 14 per cent in 2005 (Figure 2). An international
comparison also ranks Australia at a very low level (Table 1). In net terms, total fiscal liabilities
became negative in 2005.5
The key fiscal statistics of the two countries are as follows (as percentage of nominal
GDP, as at 2005):
1) Financial balances Japan –5.3%6 Australia +1.5%
2) Cyclically-adjusted balances Japan –4.9% Australia +1.5%
3) Primary balances Japan –3.9% Australia +2.8%
4) Gross financial liabilities Japan 172.1% Australia 14.4%
5) Net financial liabilities7 Japan +86.3% Australia –0.5%
6) Net debt interest payments Japan 1.3% Australia 1.3%
7) Total outlays Japan 36.9% Australia 34.9%
8) Total tax and non-tax receipts Japan 31.7%8 Australia 36.4%
It is obvious that financial balances (including cyclically-adjusted and primary balances)
and (gross and net) financial liabilities in the two countries differ widely. However, net debt
interest payments are at the same level, reflecting very low interest rates in Japan, in spite of
the difference of the size of liabilities.
Comparing the fiscal strategies of Japan and Australia, in Japan, the urgent fiscal target
is to achieve a surplus in the primary balance of the central and local governments by the early
2010s (Japanese Government, 2006). The essential aim of the target is not to raise the fiscal
liabilities ratio. The idea of primary balance is based on the proposition of Domar. This states
that if the primary balance is zero, the fiscal liabilities ratio will remain at the same level under
the precondition that nominal interest rates and the nominal growth rate of GDP are equal.
Accordingly, if nominal interest rates are higher than the nominal growth rate, as in deflation-
affected Japan (Figure 3), restoring the primary balance will not cause the fiscal liabilities ratio
to level off. Thus, the fiscal situation of Japan is far from the essential aim of the target.5
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Meanwhile in Australia, ‘the primary objective of the medium-term fiscal strategy is to
maintain budget balance, on average over the course of the economic cycle’. In addition, the
authorities prudently assume that a fiscal surplus is necessary at present ‘to meet future
challenges flowing from demographic change and increasing demand for high quality health
care’ (2006–07 Budget Paper No.1, 2006). It may safely be said that this objective has almost
been achieved.
General evaluations of fiscal conditions of the two countries are available from OECD,
IMF and rating agencies. According to the OECD, in Japan, ‘the government’s financial
position continues to deteriorate, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability at the same time
that population ageing is increasing demands for public spending’ (OECD, 2005b).
Meanwhile in Australia, public finance is very healthy. However, ‘ageing will exacerbate the
underlying rise in public health costs and to a lesser extent in public pensions, putting pressure
on public finances’ (OECD, 2005a).
On the other hand, the IMF states that in Japan, ‘the deficit remains large and the debt
ratio on an unsustainable path. Prospective demands on the budget from an ageing society
add urgency to the need for fiscal consolidation’ (IMF, 2005b). Meanwhile in Australia, it sees
‘the fiscal position is strong’. However, ‘as in many countries, Australia faces the medium-
term challenge of addressing the economic consequences of an ageing population and rising
health care costs’. Concerning the recent rapid rise in the terms of trade, the Australian
Figure 3 Nominal GDP growth rate and long-term interest rate in Japan
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authorities ‘will reevaluate the extent to which the recent terms of trade gains were a cyclical
or permanent factor, and fiscal policies would be adjusted if necessary’. The IMF supports
this forward-looking approach (IMF, 2005a).9
In a comparison of ratings of long-term government bonds by three world-famous
rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, those of Japan are ranked fourth
(AA- by S&P and Fitch) or sixth (A2 by Moody’s). These ratings have gradually been
downgraded due to the deterioration of Japanese economic and fiscal conditions, despite
having ranked highest (AAA or Aaa) until 1998. Meanwhile, those of Australia are now
ranked at the highest level as the agencies regard a strong economy and sound fiscal conditions
as most important. However, they had previously been downgraded to AA or Aa2 between
1986 and 1989 due to a concern for increasing foreign liabilities (as of December 2006).10
The fiscal conditions of Japan are very serious compared with other developed countries
even according to the Japanese authorities’ own evaluation. In addition, increases in various
expenditures due to population ageing and in interest payments and debt redemptions due
to continuing increases in government bonds outstanding make the structure of expenditures
and revenues more and more inflexible (Japanese Government, 2005).
Evaluating their own economy the Australian authorities say: ‘The fiscal outlook for
Australia continues to remain sound’; ‘Australia’s very strong fiscal position compared to
OECD countries is highlighted’; and ‘Nevertheless, a steadily ageing population is likely to
continue to place significant pressure on Commonwealth government finances’ (2006–07
Budget Paper No.1, 2006, and Commonwealth of Australia, 2002a).
Analysing these evaluations, one could develop a general view that Japanese fiscal
conditions were very serious, while those of Australia were very sound. However, the
evaluations do not seem to consider economic conditions explicitly, although population
ageing is often mentioned as a factor in a possible future deterioration of fiscal conditions. Of
course, it is probable that for the OECD and the IMF the factors influencing fiscal conditions
are buried in their reports, because they report the evaluations of fiscal conditions as a part
of those of economic conditions. However, the relationship between fiscal conditions and
other economic conditions are not clearly mentioned in the reports; there are few descriptions
that relate clearly to the fiscal conditions described above.
Meanwhile, the evaluations by rating agencies and the two governments aim mainly at
evaluating fiscal conditions. Therefore, they consider economic conditions to some degree11.
Nevertheless, factors that may influence fiscal conditions are described qualitatively and are
treated as nothing but an annotation. It is not clear how significantly those factors influence
fiscal conditions. Thus, it seems that existing evaluations of fiscal conditions are founded solely
on fiscal indicators.7
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3 How should fiscal conditions be evaluated thoroughly?
Although there would be many views on how fiscal conditions should be evaluated, this paper
focuses on the relationship between the size of fiscal liabilities and the potential ability to repay
them. If the latter exceeded the former, public finance could perform its functions
appropriately (as set out in Section 1) not worrying about the repayments of the liabilities. The
larger the latter become or the smaller the former, the better the evaluation of fiscal
conditions. In addition, both evaluations should be prospective, looking to the future, because
if public finance performs its functions in response to a prospective change in economic
conditions, the size of fiscal liabilities would reflect this.
However, the view that no liabilities are optimal would cause a problem by restricting
the flexibility of fiscal policy, and public finance could not perform its functions appropriately.
It is also important to have a balance between fiscal sustainability and the functioning of public
finance. Although there is no consensus on how this should be balanced, some amount of fiscal
liabilities should be tolerated; the evaluation of fiscal conditions should be constant even if the
liabilities are less than that amount.12 Conversely, if the size of liabilities exceed the potential
ability, public finance could hardly perform its functions; in this situation, fiscal liabilities might
become unsustainable permanently and therefore the repayments of liabilities would be
required first of all. The paper reviews this sustainability in Section 4, because this matter is
different in nature from any ordinary evaluation of fiscal conditions.
How, then, should the potential ability to repay liabilities be measured? What factors
other than fiscal indicators are to be considered? If one devises a restructuring plan for a
private corporation whose potential is of some concern, the important points will be: whether
or not the circumstances surrounding that corporation, such as business conditions, enable
the corporation to survive, and to what degree the corporation will make a commitment to
reform its size, structure, nature and so on to adapt itself to the circumstances. How should
these two criteria be applied to a government?
First, the circumstances surrounding a corporation correspond to the economic
conditions of the country concerned. Of course, there is a little difference between them; in
the case of a government, the extent to which the economy has the ability to repay liabilities
is what is relevant because ultimately the entire nation owes the liabilities, rather than the
government, while in the case of a corporation, the extent to which there is room to make
a profit is what is relevant.
Second, the willingness to reform corresponds to the determination of the authorities
to reduce liabilities. Whether the public accepts the government’s determination or not is also
important. To sum up, it does matter to what degree the entire nation intends to reduce
liabilities.138
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However, it is the creditors or the potential creditors to a government, or in a broad
sense the market, that judge directly whether the authorities have the potential ability or not.
It is hard to imagine that the market would estimate this ability objectively based on the
economic conditions and the commitment of the authorities. This ability would depend on
to what degree the market has confidence in the authorities and the economy. It should be
noted that even if the conditions affecting the government’s ability are unchanged, it would
be very likely that confidence would be shaken.14
Nevertheless, because the concept of confidence is hard to grasp, it is worth reviewing
economic conditions and the commitment of the authorities, which represent the evidence
underpinning confidence. As mentioned above, fiscal liabilities are repaid indirectly by the
economy in the end. Accordingly, if economic conditions were strong and this was expected
to continue in the future, it would be judged that the economy has great potential to repay
liabilities stably in the medium-long term. In addition, automatic increases in tax revenues
would unintentionally decrease liabilities.
How, then, can we judge whether economic conditions are strong or not? First, GDP
would be easy to understand as a means of judgment. Apart from the importance of the
contents of GDP, if liabilities are increasing in harmony with GDP, the ability to repay must
be unchanged. The fact that the fiscal liabilities ratio is generally used as one of fiscal indicators
seems to provide some support for the proposition that there is a close relationship between
fiscal and economic conditions.
In general, it would be best to take economic conditions quantitatively and evaluate
fiscal conditions comprehensively based on this. However, there are many debates about how
each economic indicator should be taken into consideration; accordingly, this may be very
difficult. The second best method is to supplement a fiscal indicator-based evaluation with
economic conditions qualitatively: to evaluate fiscal conditions from a multi-faceted viewpoint
considering economic conditions. This would cause the debates mentioned above. Therefore,
the paper mentions the remedy for this point in Section 6.
As for the commitment of the authorities to reduce liabilities, it may be possible to cut
expenditure to some degree by making public services more efficient, but to cut expenditure
on a large scale would require some reductions in public services themselves. If the authorities
do not intend to review the contents of expenditure programs, it may be difficult to expect
a sharp reduction in expenditure. Thus, the attitude of the authorities (and the people) towards
the size of expenditure and the purpose of expenditures is an important point in evaluating
the willingness of the authorities to reduce fiscal liabilities.9
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4 The sustainability of fiscal and foreign liabilities
As noted in Section 3, the two criteria for judging the potential ability to repay fiscal liabilities
are not concrete. Nevertheless, it may safely be said that if the ratio of fiscal liabilities to GDP
keeps rising, the liabilities will eventually become unsustainable because GDP has a great
influence on the potential of the economy. However, with the ratio being at a low level,
liabilities will remain sustainable for some time. Accordingly, the sustainability of fiscal
liabilities is of concern when the fiscal liabilities ratio keeps rising and the ratio substantially
exceeds the average level by international standards.15
In general, the higher the fiscal liabilities ratio is, the more a rise in interest rates will
increase interest payments and, as the result, liabilities. Accordingly, even if the liabilities ratio
stayed at the same level, a higher ratio could generate uncertainty about the sustainability of
the liabilities. Thus, the fact that the above condition is not satisfied is the minimum
requirement for the sustainability of fiscal liabilities.
There is some similarity between fiscal and foreign liabilities in that both repay liabilities.
But, there is a difference between them; fiscal liabilities are the responsibility of government’s,
while foreign liabilities are repaid by various economic entities (including the government) in
the economy. However, the government itself does not have the ability to repay fiscal
liabilities; therefore, the entire nation will ultimately be responsible for the liabilities.
Meanwhile, various economic entities in the economy are nearly equal to the entire nation.
Thus, the difference between these liabilities is not so large. Therefore, GDP has a great
influence over foreign liabilities just as it does over fiscal ones.16 If the ratio of net foreign
liabilities to GDP (or the net foreign liabilities ratio) kept rising and the ratio exceeded the
average level by international standards substantially, sustainability would be of concern.
Concerning the current account deficit in Australia causing the accumulation of foreign
liabilities, Pitchford (1989), Corden (1991) and others have developed an argument that has
been increasingly widely supported. The argument is that current account deficits reflect the
gap between investments and savings in the domestic sector, which is derived from the best
choice by well-informed people. In such a world, it does not matter whether the level of the
current account deficit is high or not. If current account deficits were derived from a structural
distortion in the economy, it would be necessary to correct the distortion. However, one
cannot assume that the current account balance would necessarily be improved by any
correction.
According to this view, it is hard to imagine the sustainability of foreign liabilities being
a concern and the minimum requirement mentioned above does not make any sense even if10
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the foreign liabilities ratio keeps rising. Indeed, given that the market mechanism will not work
for governments, it is hard to say that a government decides the size of fiscal liabilities
rationally. Therefore, if a government does not deliberately control their size, liabilities might
become unsustainable.
Meanwhile, if private entities acted completely rationally, they could decide the size of
foreign liabilities so that they would not exceed the potential ability to repay the liabilities.
However, there is what is called market failure caused by externalities and restricted
information in the economy, although private entities generally act under the market
mechanism. In such a world, it is probable that the potential ability to repay foreign liabilities
falls short of the size of the liabilities due to, for example, the fluctuation of economic
conditions, even though private entities may not intend this to occur. In general, the
probability increases as the liabilities ratio rises. Under these circumstances, the minimum
requirement for the sustainability of foreign liabilities would be of great significance.
We should now compare the fiscal liabilities in Japan and the foreign liabilities in
Australia. First, in Japan the fiscal liabilities ratio keeps rising and this is extremely high among
developed countries (Table 1). The authorities recognise fiscal conditions to be very serious
and reduction of the fiscal deficit is an urgent task. Meanwhile in Australia, as a result of
continuing current account deficits, the net foreign liabilities ratio has kept rising over the
medium-long term (Figures 4 and 5). The ratio is classed as the highest level among
Figure 4 Current balances in Japan and Australia






















developed countries (Table 2). Nevertheless, the authorities seem to think that the present
situation is not so serious that sustainability of foreign liabilities becomes a concern.17
One reason why the authorities of the two countries deal with these liabilities differently
may be the level of the liabilities ratio. The levels at which the sustainability matters would
depend on liabilities. Perhaps, the fact that the Australian economy is strong may imply that
the potential ability to repay foreign liabilities is high.18 It is also possible that the authorities
gain confidence from the fact that economic entities in the world believe that, in a growing
economy, the upward tendency in the net foreign liabilities ratio will come to a stop some
day.19
However, the Australian authorities are unlikely to be reluctant to put the brakes on the
upward trend in the foreign liabilities ratio in a steadily growing economy as long as they think
that the present situation is not serious.20 This suggests that the authorities are concerned
about the matter of foreign liabilities, albeit tacitly.21 Such an official view would reflect the
general concern among the public about the growth of foreign liabilities. Of course, it is hard
to say that there are objective grounds for this view. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
people do not think that the present situation is desirable and the authorities have to take
account of public opinion.
Figure 5 Net foreign liabilities in Australia
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Balance of Payments and International Investment Position,
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5 The influence of sustainability of foreign liabilities on fiscal
conditions
In a situation where foreign liabilities kept rising, to reduce current account deficit in order
to put the brakes on the upward trend, it is necessary to tighten fiscal policy in the short term
according to general theories of the Keynesian economics. The following explanation of this
policy change is based on the IS–LM theory22 and Mundell–Fleming theory, which extends
the former theory to an open economy application. First, tight fiscal policy shifts the IS curve
to the left. Although it is said that the effect of fiscal policy on GDP becomes smaller as the
economy matures, GDP will still decrease to some extent. With this decrease, interest rates
will fall; therefore, the capital inflow from overseas will decrease (or the capital outflow
overseas will increase). Accordingly, the currency will depreciate; as the result, the current
account balance will improve (that is, current account deficit will decline) as exports will
increase and imports will decrease. Meanwhile, a decrease in GDP will cause a decrease in
imports and this contributes to an improvement in current balance.23
Table 2 Net foreign liabilities in major countries (as of end of 2004)
Amount
(billions of $) (of GDP)
Australia (*1) +411.0 60 %
Japan –1,784.5 –37 %
Canada (*1) +151.0 13 %
France –151.0 –7 %
Germany –269.2 –9 %
Italy +123.7 7 %
Korea –90.3 –12 %
New Zealand +90.5 85 %
United Kingdom (*1) +371.0 18 %
United States +2,542.2 22  %
Argentina –3.8 –2 %
Brazil +297.7 45 %
Chile +30.2 29 %
Mexico +310.3 45 %
Venezuela –15.7 –15 %
Philippine (*2) +41.7 54 %
Poland +127.3 41 %
Russia +3.9 1 %
Notes (*1) As of end of 2005
(*2) As of end of 2003
Source: IMF, ‘International Financial Statistics’ 000 website (as of June 2006).13
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However, this means that the authorities could not loosen fiscal policy, even if the
economic conditions deteriorated considerably, particularly over a long period, apart from
the times when the economy is strong and the fiscal policy is tightened from the viewpoint
of preventing the economy from overheating. If the authorities cut taxes or increased
expenditures in order to mitigate against stagnation, fiscal liabilities would accumulate. As
Gruen and Stevens (2000) note, the view that ‘one of the reasons Australia has maintained
confidence of foreign investors over the two decades of high current account deficits has been
the fiscal restraint and discipline’, the accumulation of fiscal liabilities could cause the market
to lose confidence in the ability to repay foreign liabilities. To avoid this, loose fiscal policy
would be difficult to implement.
Of course, the upward trend in the net foreign liabilities ratio does not mean that the
liabilities are directly unsustainable. However, given that the public does not think that the
present situation is desirable (as noted in Section 4), the authorities have no option but to
tighten fiscal policy, which means there is less flexibility in fiscal policy.
6 The evaluation of fiscal conditions from a multi-faceted
viewpoint
This section evaluates the fiscal conditions of Japan and Australia from a multi-faceted
viewpoint considering the potential ability to repay fiscal liabilities, after defining the major
differences in the economic conditions of the two countries.
As mentioned in Section 2, existing evaluations of the fiscal conditions of Japan and
Australia do not explicitly take account of economic conditions. To improve this even a little,
this paper compares the different influences economic conditions of the two countries have
on fiscal conditions, which would make the evaluation of fiscal conditions more objective.
However, taking all economic indicators into consideration would make the evaluation
complicated and opaque. Accordingly, after defining major differences of economic
conditions of the two countries, Section 6 considers how these differences qualitatively
influence the fiscal conditions of the two countries. From this point of view, Table 3 compares
some economic indicators in the two countries. In this table, indicators that show major
differences between those countries are GDP, price trends, interest rates, the structure of
exports and imports, the balance of payments and foreign assets/liabilities.
GDP in Australia has grown strongly in recent years, while in Japan GDP has stagnated.
Price trends in Japan are outstanding, as their level has been falling. Interest rates in Japan
are at the lowest level in the world. As to the structure of Australian exports and imports, the
percentage of primary products in exports and that of manufactures in imports is relatively
high. Current account and foreign assets/liabilities are the most characteristic among various14
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Table 3 Comparison of main economic indicators in Japan and Australia
(Point in time) Japan Australia (Source)
GDP Real GDP growth rate 5 year average 1.4 % 3.1 % (*5)
until 2005 (*1)
Nominal GDP (in billions 2005 4,559 730
of US$)`
GDP per capita 2004 29,567 32,409
(in US$, based on PPPs)
Price Consumer price index 5 year average -0.4 % 3.0 % (*7)
(change from previous year) until 2005
Productivity Labour  productivity 1.7 % 0.9 % (*8)
(change from previous year)
Employment Unemployment rate 2005 4.4 % 5.1 % (*7)
Interest rate Long-term interest rate 2005 1.4 % 5.3 % (*7)
Saving Net household saving rate 2005 2.4 % -2.6 % (*8)
Industry Breakdown of GDP by industry
structure (% of GDP) 2004 (*1) (*5)
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 2 % 3 %
Mining 0 % 5 %
Manufacturing & construction 26 % 19 %
Others 72 % 72 %
Exports and Ratio of exports to GDP 2005 (*1) 14 % 18 % (*5)
imports Ratio of imports to GDP 13 % 21 %
Breakdown of exports by section 2005 (*4) (*9)
(% of GDP)
Food, live animal, etc. 0 % 16 %
Crude materials, mineral fuels, etc. 2 % 47 %
Manufactured goods, etc. 98 % 37 %
Breakdown of imports by section (% of GDP) (*4)
Food, live animal, etc. 10 % 4 %
Crude materials, mineral fuels, etc. 32 % 13 %
Manufactured goods, etc. 59 % 83 %
Balance of Trade balance (of GDP) 2005 (*1) 2.1 % -2.7 % (*10)
payments Current balance (of GDP) 3.6 % -6.4 %
Net foreign assets (of GDP) end of 2005(*2) 36 %- 59 %
Exchange rate Real effective exchange rate 2005 81.1 127.7 (*7)
(2000=100)
Population Total population (million) 1st Oct 2005 (*2) 128 20 (*11)
Ratio of people aged 65 and over 20 % 13 %
Ratio of people aged under 15 14 % 20 %
Total fertility rate 2005 (*1) 1.25 1.80
Life expectancy (male) 2004 (*3) 78.6 78.1
Life expectancy (female) 85.6 83.0
Note: (*1) Figures of Australia are until (or in) 2004-05. (*2) Figures of Australia are as of end of June
2005. (*3) Figures of Australia are in 2002-04. (*4) Breakdown of world exports is as follows: food,
live animal, etc. 9%, Crude materials, mineral fuels, etc. 14%, manufactured goods, etc. 74% (WTO,
‘International Trade Statistics 2005’).
Source: (*5) SNA statistics in each country. (*6) OECD, National Accounts website (as of June 2006).
(*7) OECD,’Main Economic Indicators’ (as of June 2006). (*8) OECD,’Economic Outlook
No.79' (2006). (*9) OECD, Monthly Statistics of International Trade – Data website (as of June
2006). Food, live animals, etc. is Section 0+1, crude materials, mineral fuels, etc. is Section 2-4
and manufactured goods, etc. is Section 5–9 of SITC classification. (*10) Statistics on balance
of payments and international investment position in each country. (*11) Population statistics
in each country.15
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economic indicators in the two countries as mentioned in Section 1. Table 3 shows the present
trends in economic conditions only, but the estimate of the future developments would make
the evaluation of fiscal conditions more appropriate. Although it is hard to estimate economic
indicators in the future, the following considers some future developments such as those of
population ageing which can be estimated in rough terms.
Evaluating fiscal conditions of Japan based on fiscal indicators alone is not significant.
To review such an evaluation, let us examine the economic conditions and the will of the
authorities to reduce liabilities as these are supposed to influence the evaluation of fiscal
conditions.
Considering general economic conditions, the Japanese economy is recovering after
emerging from the long depression after the collapse of the ‘Bubble’ (Figure 6). In addition,
if the structural reform of the economy now under way results in success, the economy will
become structurally stronger and grow more stably, although it is still too early to evaluate
the results objectively. Furthermore, it is significant that the nominal growth rate of GDP is
higher than the real growth rate coinciding with the disappearance of deflation. As nominal
interest rates cannot become negative, it is more probable that the nominal growth rate is
below nominal interest rates with deflating price levels. As mentioned in Section 2, in such
a situation a problem could develop if restoring the primary balance does not cause the fiscal
liabilities ratio to level off. However, as deflation disappears and the nominal growth rate
Figure 6 Nominal and real GDP growth rates in Japan and Australia
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increases, that problem will disappear. Furthermore, with the nominal growth rate becoming
higher, revenues including tax revenues will increase while expenditure will effectively
decrease leaving expenditure unchanged in spite of a price rise. These developments should
contribute to an improvement in the primary balance and therefore improve the potential
ability to repay fiscal liabilities. Thus, general economic conditions in Japan are a positive
factor in the evaluation of fiscal conditions.
Table 4 Breakdown of central government securities holders in Japan (end of 2005,
trillion yen)
Amount (*) (percentage)
General government 60 9  %
Central bank 94 14 %
Other financial institutions 451 67 %
Overseas 32 5 %
Households 26 4 %
Other 10 1 %
Total 672 100 %
Note: (*) The figures include FILP (Fiscal Investment and Loan Program) bonds.
Source: Bank of Japan, ‘Flow of Funds’.
Figure 7 Net foreign assets in Japan
Note: There is a break in the series between 1994 and 1995 because of the different definition of the figures.






















Positive net foreign assets mean that the total assets held by all domestic sectors in an
economy exceed the total liabilities. As fiscal liabilities are a part of the total liabilities, from
a macroeconomic view the greater the total assets in an economy, the greater the ability to
repay fiscal liabilities.24 However, even if the total assets were large, the authorities could not
directly allocate a part of the total assets to the repayments of the liabilities. Consequently,
positive net foreign assets in Japan are neutral aspects (or positive ones, if anything) for the
evaluation of fiscal conditions.25 In relation to current account surpluses in Japan, this shows
that Japan has maintained high levels of competitiveness in exports, which contributes to
strengthening general economic conditions.
Turning to the supply and demand of funds, in putting the brakes on the upward trend
in the fiscal liabilities ratio, it is important to watch not only trends in the nominal growth rate
of GDP but also those of interest rates, particularly, long-term real interest rates which are
determined by the supply and demand of funds in the medium-long term. A rising fiscal deficit
means a government increases the demand for money. Other things being equal, this would
narrow the gap between the supply and demand of funds in the economy, and as a result would
cause interest rates to rise. However, interest rates in Japan have tended to fall (Figure 3) in
spite of rapid increases in the fiscal deficit, because the economy is experiencing surplus
liquidity.26 At present, interest rates are still very low by international standards and this
contributes to improving potential ability to repay liabilities.
Figure 8 Account balances by economic sector in Japan
Source: Economic and social research institute, Cabinet office, 'Annual report on national accounts of
2006'.
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To estimate interest rates in the future, the prospects for the supply and demand of
funds is important. In this respect, the household savings rate is falling gradually mainly
because of population ageing (Figure 9), while the non-financial corporations are expected
to increase the demand for money as the economic recovery progresses. In addition, financial
institutions are reducing their net lending with the approach of the end of writing off bad loans.
The fact that the household sector is contributing to reducing the supply of money while the
business sector will generate an increase the demand for money could narrow the gap between
the supply and demand of funds. This might raise interest rates in the future.
Thus, the trends in interest rates in the future may be a risk factor in the evaluation of
Japan’s fiscal conditions. For any government that is reducing its fiscal deficit, it is essential
to adjust the pace of the reduction so as not to narrow the gap between the supply and demand
of funds.
Turning to the balance on social security account, expenditure on social security
occupies the largest percentage in the budget; the ratio to General Account expenditure for
the 2006 fiscal year is 26 per cent. Furthermore, the expenditure is expected to rise rapidly
in the future due to population ageing. The authorities estimate that the ratio of the total
burdens on social security to the national income will rise by 4.5 percentage points resulting
in 26.5 per cent in the 2025 fiscal year, even if the estimate takes account of the prospective
reform of the medical insurance system (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2006).
Figure 9 Net household saving rates in Japan and Australia



















In relation to Japan’s various social security systems, the public pension system, which
was the source of most concern, is said to have become sustainable through reforms
undertaken in 2004.27 These reforms are welcome because they will improve fiscal conditions
in the future. However, the reforms assume certain tax increases in the future, as well as
various economic conditions including the population trends for the next 100 years. There
is no plan to introduce tax increases at the present time. As for population trends in the future,
the birth rate might fall short of the estimation, unless the downward trend in the birth rate
is reversed. If those assumptions are not satisfied, the public pension system could fall into
deficit or the public would be required to increase their contributions or decrease benefits
further. Therefore, there still exists deep-rooted concern among the population over the
sustainability of the public pension system. Other systems such as the medical insurance
system are also in the same situation. Reform of the social security system is still Japan’s
biggest problem.
In the meantime, all of the reforms could have an adverse influence on fiscal conditions
indirectly, through an adverse effect on economic conditions, because the reform aims to
increase contributions and decrease benefits. Of course, further progress of the reforms in
the future is necessary. Nevertheless, given such indirect influences it is hard to evaluate how
the balance in the social security account might influence fiscal conditions. It would be
appropriate to suspend any full evaluation and consider them as a risk factor in the current
evaluation of fiscal conditions.
How strong is the commitment of the authorities to reduce fiscal liabilities? At present
(as of December 2006), the authorities are struggling seriously to make the fiscal conditions
sound, partly supported by economic recovery. In the General Account budget, the
authorities decided to reduce expenditure (excluding interest payments and debt redemptions)
by 6.3 per cent over 3 years starting in the 2003 fiscal year, while estimating increases in
revenue (excluding borrowings) by 9.6 per cent for the same period. As a result, the ratio of
fiscal liabilities in the central government to GDP in the 2006 fiscal year will fall for the first
time in 15 years.
To ensure fiscal conditions sound, the authorities believe that ‘the necessary increase
in the tax burdens should be minimised as much as possible by thoroughly implementing
expenditure cuts and administrative reforms’ following the principle of ‘small and efficient
government’ (Japanese Government, 2006). At the same time, a rise in the consumption tax
rate is seriously being considered. Furthermore, in the medium term, ‘Integrated reform of
expenditures and revenues’ is to be undertaken, in which ‘the government will examine the
targets of government expenditures, medium-term goals for the size of government and in
the major areas of expenditure both for the central and local governments, and issues related
to revenues in an integrated manner’ (Japanese Government, 2006).20
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As for fiscal strategies, the urgent target is to achieve a surplus in the primary balance
of the central and local governments by the early 2010s for the purpose of the control of the
fiscal liabilities ratio. In addition, the authorities are now considering the next target to reduce
that ratio steadily after achieving the urgent target. Thus, various measures to reform the
structure of expenditure are progressing so that expenditure can be reduced continuously.
From the viewpoint of the ability to manage public finances, there is no denying that the
measures are still developing compared with those of Australia. However, full-scale
consideration of these measures is worth evaluating positively. It is hard to imagine that the
public would support rebalancing the fiscal balance positively, particularly the rise in the rate
of the consumption tax. However, it is also hard to prove that the rebalancing will have a
serious effect on people and the economy as long as the economy keeps recovering. Yet the
public will understand the rise, even if not positively. So the commitment of the authorities
to reduce liabilities has never been questioned and should be considered as a positive factor
although some problems still exist.
As mentioned in Section 2, based on fiscal indicators alone, the fiscal conditions of
Australia would be perceived to be very sound, contrary to Japan. However, this paper also
examines the economic conditions and the size of fiscal liabilities as they are supposed to
influence the evaluation of the fiscal conditions. Recently, the Australian economy has been
strong and resilient under favourable circumstances such as moderate inflation and low
unemployment (Table 3 and Figure 6); real GDP has grown nearly 4 per cent per year on
average. This good performance of the economy is held to be the result of ‘wide-ranging
reform, to both the microeconomic structure of the economy as well as the macroeconomic
policy frameworks’ (Gruen and Sayegh, 2005). Under those circumstances, it is hard to
envisage the fiscal balance going into a large deficit because of an automatic decrease in tax
revenues caused by worsening economic conditions, or because of large tax cuts or
expenditure increases to ease an economic downturn. Thus, it is obvious that general
economic conditions of Australia are a positive factor in the evaluation of fiscal conditions.28
In Australia, the rising ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP may generate some concerns
in the market. As a result, the authorities have no option but to tighten fiscal policy, which
means less flexibility in fiscal policy, as mentioned in Section 5. The fact that the fiscal balance
of Australia has been in surplus even on a structural basis29 would reflect fiscal policy keeping
generally tight.30
Heavy dependence on primary products in exports and manufactures in imports is
characteristic of the structure of foreign trade in Australia (Table 3).31 Therefore, Australia’s
exports are affected by global investment demand that fluctuates widely and are hard for
Australia to control.32 This would suggest that the structure of exports in Australia was
unstable. Based on such a structure, let us suppose that exports decrease substantially due to21
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a deterioration in the global economy. In this case, the growth rate of GDP will generally fall
and therefore, it is probable that the net foreign liabilities ratio rise rapidly.33 Particularly, if
the global economy continued to flounder for a long time, it is possible that a loss of confidence
in the Australian economy could occur and make Australia’s foreign liabilities become
unsustainable.
Indeed, if currency adjustment were sufficient, this would generally reduce the current
account deficit and therefore could not increase the net foreign liabilities ratio. However, in
the current situation where the terms of trade are at a high level accompanied by the
appreciation of the dollar, it is likely that the dollar will depreciate sharply (Figure 10). This
could have an adverse effect on the economy with a sharp decrease in imports while the
depreciation would reduce current account deficit. Thus, regardless of whether the dollar
depreciation is sufficient or not, the problems mentioned above could occur. If expansionary
fiscal policy were adopted to make such a situation better, fiscal indicators would worsen.
As mentioned in Section 2, the Australian authorities seem to be concerned about the
trend in the terms of trade, and the IMF supports the authorities’ view. This provides a strong
reason why the authorities should disclose the medium-long term prospects for the structure
of foreign trade and the trends in foreign liabilities, that is, the prospects of how the authorities
would construct a stable structure for foreign trade and the resulting manner in which foreign
liabilities would grow. It is essential to prepare appropriate measures to deal with this problem
Figure 10 Implicit price deflators (IPD) for goods and services credits and debits terms
of trade and exchange rates in Australia
Note: IPD and Terms of Trade are indexes of 2003-04=100.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, Mar.
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before the situation worsens, given that the flexibility of fiscal policy is restricted, as mentioned
in Section 5. This analysis suggests that the structure of foreign trade in Australia, particularly
that of exports, is a risk factor in the evaluation of fiscal conditions unless the medium-long
term prospects mentioned above are revealed.
In Australia, unlike Japan, it does not matter whether or not the authorities raise funds
to make up for fiscal deficit, as the fiscal balance has been in surplus. However, it is possible
that the economy could become unstable because of the fluctuations in the supply and demand
of funds in the private sector, which could have an adverse effect on fiscal conditions.
Reviewing developments in the account balance by economic sector for the past 20 years is
set out in Figure 11. The balance in the external sector has been positive (that is, in current
account deficit) and that in the government sector became positive several years ago, while
the balance in the business sector has been negative and that in the household sector became
negative recently affected by the long-lasting downward tendency in household savings rates
(Figure 9).34
Since private corporations usually raise money for their activities because they do not
have enough available funds, the balance in the business sector is normally negative. In
Australia, the business sector had been financed by the household sector and the external
sector. Nevertheless, the business sector has come to depend largely on overseas funds as net
household savings rates became negative in macroeconomic terms. In addition, the savings
Figure 11 Account balances by economic sector in Australia




























rate may fall further in the future due to population ageing, although that does not seem to
influence the savings rate for the present (see footnote 34). Thus, the structure of the supply
and demand for funds is becoming unstable because the business sector has become very
dependent on overseas funds. This is a risk factor in the evaluation of fiscal conditions.
Expenditure on social security in Australia represents the largest share in the budget,
as it does in Japan (the percentage in 2004–05 is 29 per cent for all levels of government
including state and local governments). In addition, the authorities estimate that if policies are
not adjusted, the fiscal balance of the federal government will deteriorate rapidly from a
surplus to a deficit amounting to 5 per cent of GDP by 2041–42 mainly because population
ageing will increase expenditure on social security, directly or indirectly (Commonwealth of
Australia, 2002a).35 The ageing population will cause the balances in social security to
deteriorate, unless a self-funding method is adopted throughout the social security system.36
In Australia, the social security system is based on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ system in broad terms:
general revenues such as tax revenues to balance the account for the social security system.37
Accordingly, although ageing in Japan is believed to be more rapid than that of Australia
(Table 5), we should pay attention to the fact that population ageing affects Australia more
directly than Japan.38
In view of the estimates that the balance in the social security account will deteriorate
rapidly, the Australian government established the ‘Future Fund’ in 2005–06 fiscal year,
Table 5 Forecast for future population structures in Japan and Australia
                             Japan                        Australia
2050 Changes from 2051 Changes from
(Forecast) 2000 (Forecast) 2000
Total population [billion] 101 –21 % 28 +47 %
Ratio of people aged 65 and over 36 % +18 % point 26 % +13 % point
Ratio of people aged under 15 11 % –4 % point 15 % –6 % point
(Assumptions)
  Total fertility rate 1.39 +0.03 1.7 –0.1
  Life expectancy (male) 81.0 +3.3 84.9 +8.4
                           (female) 89.2 +4.6 88.0 +6.
  Net overseas migration [thousand] 77 +47 110 –1
Source: [Japan] National institute of population and Social Security Research, ‘Population Projections
for Japan: 2001–2050’ (2002). (The assumptions use the medium variant projection.)
[Australia] Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Population Projections, Australia, 2004 to 2101’
(2006). (The assumptions use Series B.)24
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which aims to accumulate sufficient financial assets to offset the federal government’s
unfunded superannuation liabilities by around 2020 ($18 billion were accumulated as seed
capital). Nevertheless, in comparison with Japan, the reform of the social security system in
Australia seems to be making less progress. Nevertheless, considering the adverse influence
this reform could have indirectly on fiscal conditions (as noted on pp.19–20), it would be
appropriate to suspend final evaluation of how the trends in the balance in the social security
account will influence fiscal conditions and consider this as a risk factor in the evaluation of
fiscal conditions, as it is in Japan.
Looking at the size of fiscal liabilities, the Australian authorities have explained that fiscal
surpluses are necessary because the government must accumulate funds from now on to
prepare for the future when the fiscal balance will be in huge deficit under the current fiscal
structure. Indeed, having enough funds to prepare for the future would indicate that fiscal
conditions were sound. However, it is certain that funds will be exhausted in the future.
Meanwhile, even if one did not take the future developments of fiscal liabilities into
consideration, net fiscal liabilities being negative at the present time would not be evaluated
positively in inverse proportion to their size, as noted in Section 3. Thus, the size of fiscal
liabilities, regardless of the future developments, could not be a positive factor in the evaluation
of fiscal conditions.
Let us compare the evaluations of Australia and Japan, examining every item that
influences the fiscal conditions of the two countries.
• General economic conditions of Australia are much better than that of Japan. Nevertheless,
in Japan it should be noted that the disappearance of deflation would put the brakes on the
upward trend of the fiscal liabilities ratio.
• For Australia, the rising ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP is a negative factor because it makes
fiscal policy less flexible. Meanwhile, the development of net foreign assets in Japan is a neutral
factor.
• The structure of exports in Australia is unstable as exports are largely composed of primary
products. Therefore, there is a risk that overseas factors such as the deterioration of the global
economy could worsen the fiscal conditions through increasing concern for the sustainability
of foreign liabilities or having an unfavourable effect on the economy.
• For Japan, the supply and demand of funds may tighten with the present economic recovery
and this may raise interest rates in the future. Meanwhile, for Australia the structure of the
supply and demand of funds is becoming unstable because the business sector comes to
depend largely on overseas funds. Thus, the supply and demand of funds is a risk factor for
both countries.
• The balance in the social security account is a factor that worsens the fiscal conditions for both
countries, although it seems that the reform of the social security system in Japan is making25
No. 363, 2007
more progress than it is in Australia. Regardless, at present it is not clear what reforms will be
undertaken and what influences the reforms will have on the economies; therefore, it would
be appropriate for both countries to consider the account balance on social security as a risk
factor.
• The commitment of the authorities to reduce liabilities does not apply for Australia as there
are no net fiscal liabilities, while for Japan this is a positive factor because the commitment of
the authorities has never been questioned as they are struggling seriously to make the fiscal
conditions sound.
• It is obvious that the sustainability of fiscal liabilities in Japan is questionable, while net fiscal
liabilities in Australia, which recently became negative, could not be a positive factor regardless
of future developments of the liabilities.
Summarising the above points, general economic conditions of Australia are much
better than those of Japan, while Japan has an advantage because of the development of
foreign assets/liabilities, and the structure of foreign trade. In addition, the commitment of
the authorities to reduce liabilities and the size of fiscal liabilities will positively affect the
evaluation of Japan relative to Australia.
Of course, the evaluation from the multi-faceted viewpoint as argued above should not
be decided by the country that has the largest number of favourable characteristics. Strong
economic conditions would offset negative factors and prevent risk factors from surfacing.
However, the strong economic conditions of Australia owe much to the overseas economic
developments that are hard for the authorities to control; therefore, if these conditions
deteriorated, the risk factors mentioned above could become more significant. Given these
circumstances, the difference between the evaluations of both countries is not so large, in
comparison with the difference between evaluations based on fiscal indicators alone.
7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the fiscal conditions of Japan and Australia from the multi-faceted
viewpoint taking account of all factors that seem relevant. The evaluations are based on the
understanding that they should include under what circumstances fiscal conditions are
estimated to be sound in the first place and what explicit influence economic conditions (such
as the state of foreign liabilities) have on fiscal conditions.
Of course, existing evaluations of fiscal conditions would generally reflect economic
conditions; however, that is not an explicit factor. To rectify this even a little, this paper
evaluates the fiscal conditions of both countries comparing the difference between the
influences economic conditions of those countries have on fiscal conditions, which would
make the evaluations more objective.26
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The following characteristic points seem to have a great influence on the evaluation of
the fiscal conditions of the two countries.
First, foreign liabilities: Australia has large net foreign liabilities. It is said that if the ratio
of the Japanese fiscal liabilities to GDP continues to rise, those liabilities will eventually become
unsustainable; similarly, in Australia the fact that the ratio of the foreign liabilities to GDP
keeps rising will arouse concerns in the market. As a result, the authorities have no option
but to tighten fiscal policy, which means there is less flexibility in fiscal policy.
Second, the structure of foreign trade: the structure of exports in Australia seems to
be unstable and this could have some kind of adverse influence on fiscal conditions by creating
risks for the sustainability of foreign liabilities. It is hard to imagine that the Australian
authorities are not concerned about the foreign liabilities. Nevertheless, the authorities should
disclose the medium-long term prospects for the structure of foreign trade and the trends of
foreign liabilities, that is, the prospects of how the authorities would construct a stable
structure of foreign trade and the resulting manner in which the foreign liabilities would grow.
Third, the size of fiscal liabilities: net fiscal liabilities in Australia, which recently became
negative, could not be a positive factor in the evaluation of fiscal conditions regardless of future
developments of the liabilities.
Given the assessment in Section 6 covering these three points, the difference between
the evaluations of the two countries is smaller than the difference based on fiscal indicators
alone. Of course, there would be a refutation that the evaluation for Australia was too
pessimistic. However, as the Australia’s fiscal indicators illustrate best performance, it will be
very natural that one cannot find many positive factors in the evaluation of fiscal conditions.
Furthermore, policy management, which the multi-faceted evaluations above do not take into
consideration, would offset negative factors and prevent risk factors from coming to the
surface, provided it is carried out appropriately.
As public finance and the economy are closely related, the fact that the multi-faceted
evaluation shows a worse result than fiscal indicator-based evaluation as is the case for
Australia, would imply that current fiscal problems have already appeared in the economy to
some extent. Meanwhile, the opposite relationship, as is the case for Japan, would similarly
imply that public finance has shouldered the economic problems caused by the collapse of the
‘Bubble’.
If either economic or fiscal conditions are in imbalance, some problems will occur from
the viewpoint of both economic stability and fiscal soundness. Accordingly, the evaluation of
fiscal conditions based on fiscal indicators alone would not give a comprehensive picture of
public finance. Indeed, it is a very hard task to examine how economic conditions influence
fiscal ones; nevertheless, fiscal conditions should be evaluated as part of economic conditions.
The fiscal conditions of Japan and Australia are a good example to illustrate this.27
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1 Given the functions that public finance should perform in the national economy, the size
of government expenditure, the purpose of expenditures and those who finance expendi-
tures should be considered in such an evaluation. However, consideration of these matters
in themselves is a big subject, so this paper focuses on the matters of fiscal balance and
liabilities.
2 The fiscal indicators shown below are those of the OECD, ‘Economic Outlook No.79’ (2006)
unless otherwise stated.
3 Fiscal balance can be divided into cyclical balance, which is the fiscal balance that fluctuates
with the economic cycle, and structural balance (or cyclically-adjusted balance), which is the
fiscal balance that excludes the cyclical balance. In ‘Economic Outlook No.79’, the structural
balance in 2005 is –4.9 per cent of GDP relative to –5.2 per cent that is the ratio of the fiscal
balance (on a basis of the Social Security Fund included) to GDP.
4 Primary balance is the fiscal balance reached after subtracting expenditures (excluding
interest payments and debt redemptions) from tax and other revenues (excluding borrow-
ings). The primary balance in 2005 is –3.9 per cent of GDP. For the meaning of primary
balance, see p.5.
5 One of the reasons why the fiscal balance has improved rapidly is a concerted effort to curtail
expenditures, which can be praised as a success in the reform of budget management.
However, ‘Total outlays’ (which is defined by OECD) nearly doubled in 13 years ending
in 2005 because GDP more than doubled although the ratio of the outlays to GDP
decreased by 4.1 percentage point in the same period. Meanwhile, ‘Total tax and non-tax
receipts’ (also defined by OECD) increased by 3.6 per cent of GDP although more than
half of the automatic increase financed tax cuts. Receipts increased steeply, to 2.4 times the
1992 figure. Thus, it should be noted that expenditure has been cut in terms of GDP ratio,
but not in terms of the amount; therefore, expenditure has not been reduced. The major
factor in the success of the reduction of fiscal deficit is a continuing strong economy, which
has never needed an additional increase in expenditure to stimulate the economy while
automatically bringing a large increase in revenue.
6 This figure excludes the account in the Social Security Fund because the pension systems
of Japan are partly based on a self-funding method; the assets of that account correspond
to future liabilities practically. If included, the figure is –5.2 per cent. For reference, see
footnote 36 to 38.
7 In comparing gross and net liabilities, theoretically, net liabilities must be more comprehen-
sive; however, if considered in net terms, there is a good deal of discussion about how the
future liabilities of public pension system should be estimated.
8 In Japan, this figure corresponds to the national burden rate, which is calculated as the ratio
of tax burden and social security contribution to national income, not to GDP that is used
in the OECD.
9 The IMF mention of the relationship with the terms of trade is noteworthy because it is rare
for the IMF to describe the relationship between fiscal and economic conditions explicitly.
The relationship with the terms of trade is argued in Section 6.
10 Among G7 countries, although Italy is ranked at about the same level as Japan, the other
countries are at the highest level.
11 In the Budget Paper of Australia both Fiscal Outlook and Economic Outlook are described
in detail given that ‘the government’s medium-term fiscal strategy is an integral part of the28
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economic management framework designed to deliver suitable economic growth’. In
addition, there is one chapter concerning risk factors (Statement of Risks).
12 Some amount of fiscal liabilities will also be required from a viewpoint that government
bonds are necessary to establish and maintain an appropriate financial market. In Australia,
as an improvement in fiscal balance brought a reduction in government bond issues,
stakeholders began to worry about the future viability of the bond market. Therefore, the
authorities published a discussion paper to canvas opinions (Commonwealth of Australia,
2002b). Following this, the authorities announced in the 2003–04 Budget Paper that
government bond issues would be maintained, considering various circumstances including
the possibility that financial markets might become less diverse and more vulnerable in the
absence of the bonds.
13 In 2002 when some rating agencies downgraded Japanese government bonds, the Ministry
of Finance sent letters outlining their views to the agencies (Kawakami, 2002). The
following is the main points; 1) ratings should be decided comprehensively taking into
consideration not only fiscal conditions but also the fundamentals of an economy. In this
context, the Japanese fundamentals are sound as Japan has the world’s largest current
account surpluses and foreign assets. 2) Japan is struggling positively to reform the economic
and fiscal structure. Considering these points, the Japanese government suggested the
ratings were too low. These two points would correspond to the two criteria for judgment
in the text, respectively.
14 After starting in Thailand, the Asian financial crisis in late 1990s spread to other Asian
countries. However, in those countries not all the economic conditions had been deterio-
rating. The direct cause of the crisis is the market (or major members of the market) losing
confidence in the economies and this infected the other countries one after another.
15 There is no consensus on what level that ratio enters into ‘danger zones’. Nevertheless, it
is very helpful that the EU requires that fiscal liabilities (in gross terms) is less than 60 per
cent of GDP as one of the condition for a country to be admitted into the EU and to adopt
the Euro.
16 Although fiscal liabilities are in gross terms that do not include assets, foreign liabilities are
in net terms, because there is no difference in nature between foreign assets and liabilities
as foreign assets for one country corresponding to foreign liabilities for other countries.
17 Gruen and Sayegh (2005) of the Australian Treasury regard the view of Pitchford and others
as persuasive. They also support the argument of Debelle and Galati (2005) that in
developed countries the adjustment of current balances is brought about by endogenous
factors – ‘responding to the resolution of domestic imbalances’, not by exogenous factors
‘where the size of the current account deficit itself precipitates the adjustment’ accompanied
by a change in the nature of capital flows. Although Gruen and Sayegh state that their view
is not necessarily that of the Australian Treasury, it is hard to imagine the official view being
far from their view.
18 If there were any signs that the sustainability of foreign liabilities was of concern, first of all
interest rates would rise because of the growing risk premium. In this respect, Gruen and
Sayegh (2005) note that ‘if there is currently a risk premium on Australian long bonds, it
is a fairly small one’ based on the developments of long bond yields in major countries.
19 Based on the formula found in footnote 33, even if the net foreign liabilities ratio kept rising,
the ratio would level off some day provided the ratio of current account deficit to GDP and
the nominal growth rate of GDP were constant. For example, suppose that the current
account deficit ratio is 5 per cent and the growth rate is 6 per cent. In this case, the net foreign
liabilities ratio will level off at about 83 per cent after continuing to rise, other things being
equal. Actually, the result may differ depending on the fluctuation of the currency and
market prices and so on.29
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20 Gruen and Sayegh (2005) estimate that if the goods and services trade balance turned to
a surplus of about ½ to ¾ per cent of GDP, the net liabilities ratio would remain at the same
level. Based on this estimate, they maintain that ‘the requirement to run average surpluses
of ½ to ¾ per cent of GDP in future does not appear too onerous an adjustment task for
the economy’, given that exports and imports are both about 20 per cent of GDP. However,
it is hard to imagine that surpluses will occur quickly given the trend in the trade balance (–
2.7 per cent of GDP in 2004–05).
21 This view is reinforced by the fact that the authorities would not openly express concern
about the sustainability of foreign liabilities so as to avoid anxiety in the public.
22 The Investment Savings equilibrium/Liquidity preference/Money supply equilibrium.
23 Meanwhile, a change in monetary policy generally has a smaller influence on current balance
than on fiscal policy, according to the broad thrust of these theories.
24 Reviewing a general pattern of fiscal collapses in the past, not only fiscal balances but also
current balances of the collapsed economies had been in deficit, as their economies were
financed from overseas because of a shortage of domestic savings. Consequently, in those
countries not only fiscal liabilities but also foreign liabilities continued to increase. Under
those circumstances, with a loss of confidence in the economy, financing funds move back
overseas; therefore, both fiscal and foreign liabilities collapse. However, such a general
pattern of fiscal collapses does not apply to Japan as it does not have net foreign liabilities
and most of its fiscal liabilities are not financed from overseas. The ratio of the holdings by
overseas investors to fiscal liabilities is 5 per cent in Japan (as of end of 2005, see Table 4),
while the ratios in the other G5 countries range from 20 per cent to 45 per cent.
25 The accumulation of foreign assets in a country, particularly in a large country, result in
foreign liabilities in other countries. Based on the minimum requirement for the sustainability
of liabilities, a continuous rise in the ratio of the net foreign assets to GDP may make the
international composition of foreign trade risky. This can indirectly have an adverse
influence on fiscal conditions through its influence over economic conditions. However,
actual developments in Japan show that the net foreign assets ratio has recently remained
at the same level (Figure 7).
26 The following is the developments of the account balances (net lending (+) /net borrowing
(–) by economic sector since the collapse of the ‘Bubble’ (Figure 8).
1) The balance in the external sector has been constantly negative (that is, in current account
surplus) and the net borrowing (in percentage of GDP) has not fluctuated so much, which
means that both receipts from overseas and payments overseas have shown similar trends.
2) The balance in the business sector went from negative to positive due to the economic
downturn after the collapse. In the business sector, the balance in the financial institutions
became positive because they needed funds to write off bad loans arising from the collapse.
Meanwhile, the balance in the non-financial corporations also became positive recently
because of a slump in their business activities and the repayments of their excess liabilities.
3) The household sector reduced net lending gradually as household savings rates fell
(Figure 9) mainly because of population ageing.
4) The balance in the government sector became negative (that is, in fiscal deficit) while
having been marginally positive before, and led to increased borrowings. Recently,
however, net borrowing has levelled off.
To put these developments in order roughly, the business sector came to have net lending
and therefore, the government sector absorbed surplus money in the economy in the form
of borrowings. Using the money, the government increased expenditures and cut taxes to
prevent GDP from cooling down. Lower interest rates would indicate that the surplus by
the business sector exceeded the absorption by the government.30
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27 For example, the Employees’ Pension reform aim is that the income substitution ratio of
benefits should fall gradually from 59.3 per cent to 50.2 per cent, while the insurance
premiums should rise from 13.6 per cent to 18.3 per cent. By doing this, the accounts for
the public pension system can maintain a balance between benefits and contributions for
the next 100 years.
28 A strong economy also makes foreign liabilities more sustainable through increasing and
stabilising the denominator of the foreign liabilities ratio. This will also be a positive factor
in the evaluation of fiscal conditions.
29 According to the economic theory noted in Section 5, tight fiscal policy ought to cause the
depreciation of the currency. Nevertheless, the actual development shows that after having
tended to fall until about 2000, the Australian dollar turned upward and recently levels off
(Figure 10). The reason is supposed to be the influence of a rise in resource prices and
therefore, tight fiscal policy will not take effect. However, if the authorities put the fiscal
policy back to a natural one, this could have an adverse effect; the dollar would appreciate
and therefore, the current account deficit in Australia could expand further.
30 In Australia, there has been vigorous controversy about the relationship between current
account deficit and fiscal balance for a long time. In the 1990s, the Fitzgerald report
(commissioned by the Treasury) played a theoretical role in the reduction of fiscal deficit
in connection with foreign liabilities. In the report, he insists the necessity of raising public
sector savings (in other words, the necessity of reducing fiscal deficit), noting that ‘we
cannot, on a sustainable basis, continue to finance the investment we need to grow by going
progressively further into foreign debt’. ‘It is national saving that matters in meeting the
challenge we face’ (FitzGerald, 1993). Makin (2002) also argues the necessity of reducing
fiscal deficit from a viewpoint similar to FitzGerald. He adds that GDP will increase with the
boosting of domestic investments, as a decrease in foreign liabilities will cause a fall in any
risk premium of interest rates related to the liabilities.
31 Although the percentage of primary products in imports of Japan is also high relative to the
average in the world, that percentage is still smaller than the percentage of primary products
in exports of Australia (see Table 3).
32 As primary products are generally susceptible to investment demands while manufactures
are susceptible to consumption demands, Australia’s exports are vulnerable to investment
demands and the imports are vulnerable to consumption demands. The fluctuation of
investment demands is generally larger than that of consumption demands; therefore, in
Australia it is likely that the fluctuation of exports is larger than that of imports. Incidentally,
it is obvious that exports are mainly affected by global demands that are hard for the country
concerned to control.
33 The condition that the net foreign liabilities ratio does not rise is:
∆ (NFL/GDP) / (NFL/GDP) <= 0
NFL: Net foreign liabilities
 If excluding the influences by the fluctuations of the currency, market prices and so on, the
basic relationship between current balance and net foreign liabilities is:
∆NFL = –BP
BP: Current balance
 Accordingly, the condition is:
∆(NFL/GDP) / (NFL/GDP) = ∆NFL / NFL – ∆GDP / GDP = –BP / NFL – g < = 0
g: The nominal growth rate of GDP
To put this in order, the following formula is derived.
 IM – EX <= g * NFL
EX: Receipts from overseas
IM: Payments overseas31
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If exports decrease and the growth rate fall, the left side of the formula will increase and the
right side will decrease. Therefore, it is probable that the formula will not hold; the fact noted
in the text is obtained. Of course, a fall in the growth rate will bring about a decrease in imports
and therefore, this will decrease the left side. Nevertheless, it is likely that this decrease is
generally smaller than the increase in the right side due to the decrease in exports mentioned
above. Incidentally, the proposition of Domar mentioned in Section 2 is a different version
of the formula mentioned above.
34 Australian Treasury (2005) insists that financial deregulation has contributed to an increase
in the level of household borrowing through significantly improving the efficiency and
performance of the Australian financial system. Edey and Gower (2000) note that ‘With
most of the baby-boom generation in Australia now at, or close to, the age of maximum
saving, simple life-cycle theories would therefore predict that demographic trends will soon
begin to reduce household saving. Yet formal evidence to link age profiles to saving in an
Australian context is scarce and inconclusive’.
35 For all levels of government, the fiscal balance is estimated to deteriorate by around –6.4
percentage points by 2044–45 relative to 2003–04 in the absence of policy responses
(Australian Productivity Commission, 2005). Incidentally, Gruen and Sayegh (2005) note
that ‘rising public health costs account for most of the projected deterioration in the primary
budget balance. Of this, more than half is attributable to non-demographic health pressures,
including (presumed) invention of improved, but more expensive, medical technologies
and drugs’. However, the non-demographic health pressures are closely related with
population ageing, which, therefore, could almost explain the deterioration in the fiscal
balance directly or indirectly.
36 Using a self-funding method, which can be used in pension systems, each working
generation sets aside funds necessary for retirement life and uses the accumulated funds and
management gains on the funds as pension benefits after reaching the age of pension
payment eligibility.
37 Under a ‘pay-as-you-go’ system, necessary benefits are financed by premiums contributed
by the living generation. Australia had adopted that system before, but recently has begun
to set aside funds for the future as mentioned below, which is not consistent with the
philosophy of a ‘pay-as-you-go’ system; such funds dilute the character of that system.
38 In Japan, the Social Security Fund, which is a class of the General Government in the SNA
(the System of National Accounts), has net financial assets of 212 trillion yen (43 per cent
of GDP, as of end of the 2004 fiscal year) as the public pension system of Japan is a mixture
of the system based on self-funding method and ‘pay-as-you-go’ system.
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